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I INTRODUCTION 
There is an argument that cell phones, and particularly the transmitters that serve 
them, emit some sort of dangerous radiation that has the potential to cause cancer in the 
• 
human body. In New Zealand this issue has been confronted in the Environment Court 
under the Resource Management Act 1991 . The Shirley case concerns a primary school 
in Christchurch.' The school management objected to Telecom's application to erect a 
cell phone transmitter on a property adjoining the school. The school's appeal to the 
Environment Court was unsuccessful. This paper will investigate how cell phone 
transmitters work, whether electromagnetic radiation from transmitters might constitute a 
trespass, and what remedies are available to the Court if an actionable trespass is 
established. 
II CELLS/TES 
Cell phones operate by receiving signals from a transmitter known as a ' cellsite'. 
Cellsites are basically an antenna array connected to a transmitter (to send the signal) and 
a receiver (to receive the signal sent back from the phone). The cellsite is fed by the local 
power supply and is connected to the local telephone exchange. 
Cellsites are dotted all over the country to provide a continuous signal to anyone 
wanting to use a cell phone. Each cell site services one ' cell '. This is the term for the 
geographic area that serviced by one cellsite. These areas form what can be described as a 
mosaic pattern. The aim is for each cell area to touch up against another one, but not to 
overlap . 
Most cellsites normally operate fifteen channels, one channel per conversation. 
Each channel transmits on a different frequency to ensure that the conversations do not 
interfere with one another. 
I Shirley Pri111ary School & Teleco111 Afobile Co111munications Li111ited v Christchurch City Council 
(14 December 1998) unreported Environment Court, Christrchurch CI36/98, Judge Jackson [Shirley]. 
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In densely populated urban areas there are many cellsites across the city. To 
picture why so many cell sites are needed, imagine if there was only one to serve the whole 
of Wellington. The result would be that only fifteen conversations could be carried on at 
any one time. In order to increase the number of possible conversations, the network 
operators (for example, Telecom) install many cellsites. 
Across the city the same frequencies are duplicated in each cellsite. To avoid 
interference from neighbouring cellsites, each cellsite is carefully designed to transmit its 
signal only as far as the edge of its cell . There is sophisticated software which allows one 
to move across the city, served by many different cellsites, while maintaining a continuous 
conversation. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that there are more cellsites in urban areas than in 
rural regions, the urban cellsites use less power than their rural counterparts. Out in the 
country there are fewer people using cell phones at the same time, thus, fewer channels are 
required. The network operators can afford to install fewer cellsites as long as they pump 
the signal out as far as people require it. So, out in the country you can be served by the 
one cellsite with a strong signal over a very large area, compared to the city, where there 
are hundreds of small cellsites that each use only a small amount of power, with a 
correspondingly small coverage area. 
There is evidence which suggests to some people that the signal from cellsite 
transmitters increases a person ' s chance of developing cancer.2 In particular, people are 
concerned that the risk is greater when the signal is more powerful. 
Ill ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION 
The cellsite transmits signals to the various cell phones within its area. This signal 
is sent using electromagnetic radiation. It is important to accept at this stage that it is only 
energy which is ' sent ' through the air; no particles travel from the transmitter to the cell 
phone. 
2 Shirley above n 1, 30-46, 72-90 . 
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Electromagnetic radiation is created when there are fluctuations in the 
electromagnetic field. This field is composed of an electric field, and a magnetic field . An 
' electric field ' is simply the term used to described the pull that a positively charged 
electron exerts on the negatively charged electrons around it; the closer the positive 
charge, the stronger the pull. Magnetic fields are created when electricity flows in a 
circuit. This is how magnetic doors work. By running electricity through both the plates 
on the door and on the frame, a strong magnetic field is created in each plate. The door 
' locks' when the plates stick together like magnets. 
It was observed in the mid 19th century that electric fields create magnetic fields, 
and magnetic fields create electric fields .3 So, the flow of electrons in the antenna circuit 
creates a magnetic field around the antenna. This magnetic field then creates an electric 
field, and so on. This effect continues on forever through space and time. In this way a 
disturbance in the electromagnetic field is propagated out from the cell site. 
The electromagnetic wave created when the circuit is first turned on will travel out 
forever. The equipment in the cell site is designed to quickly turn the electric current on 
and off This creates fluctuations in the magnetic field closest to the antenna, because as 
soon as the electrons stop flowing in the circuit, the magnetic field ceases. This 
fluctuation then affects the electric field . This technique creates 'waves ', just like waves 
of pressure; first strong, then weak. By altering how fast the current is turned on and off, 
the frequency of the wave is altered. It is this subtle change in the frequency of the waves 
(literally how quickly they are created), that is detected by the cell phone and then 
translated into a voice pattern. 
The cell phone network operates on a frequency of around one thousand million 
cycles per second (109 Hertz) . This is known as radio frequency radiation (RF radiation) . 
Different frequencies create different effects. The range of frequencies and effects 
is known as the electromagnetic spectrum. Other effects include visible light, ultraviolet 
light (about twice the frequency of RF radiation), and x-rays. 
3 Carl Sagan The Demon-Haunted /Vorld (2 ed, Headline Book Publishing, London, 1997) 362. 
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It is important to distinguish between RF radiation and other types of radiation 
created at different frequencies. This paper is only concerned with the risk posed by RF 
radiation. 
IV TRESPASS 
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is 
liable to an action, though the damage be nothing . . . . , ,4 
Historically, the tort of trespass was designed to protect an occupier's exclusive 
right to possession. This begs the question, possession of what? Land includes soil, grass, 
and trees. It also includes the fixtures on the land. Does 'land' include the airspace above 
the soil as well? 
A The Meaning of 'Land' 
Davies v Bennison provides an amusing illustration of the rule that applies to your 
airspace. 5 In that case, the defendant shot at the plaintiff's cat, which promptly died with 
the bullet still lodged inside. Because the bullet did not make contact with the ground it 
was argued that there was no trespass. Chief Justice Nicholls found there was a trespass 
by reference to the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, which is the notion 
that you possess that column of earth and air that extends from the centre of the earth up 
to the heavens.6 However, he noted that there were probably restrictions on this maxim, 
4 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 ST TR 1030: 95 ER 807 (CP) per Camden LJ, in William C Hodge and 
others Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 49. 
5 Davies v Bennison (1927) 22 Tasmania LR 52 (HCA). 
6 Davies v Bennison above n 5, 55. 
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and resolved the case by saying "I can see no doubt whatever that an owner' s rights 
extend to a height sufficient to cover the facts of this case". 
7 
The case of Bernstein v Skyviews echoes this doubt about the maxim.
8 Justice 
Griffiths found that an airplane which flew over the Baron' s land at a height of several 
hundred feet above the ground did not amount to a trespass. The rule seems to be that 
"the rights of an owner in the air space above his land [ are restricted] to such height as is 
necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures upon it 
,,9 
Electromagnetic radiation constitutes a trespass to land because it invades that 
space which is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of land. The fact that signals 
can be received inside houses, and outside on people' s lawns, shows very clearly that the 
radiation invades that space which is reasonably used by landowners. 
B The Definition of Trespass 
The tort of trespass is not easy to define. However, it can be described as an 
intentional, direct, invasion, of land possessed by another. Electromagnetic radiation can 
satisfy all these elements. This test will be applied to a hypothetical couple who are 
concerned about the effects of electromagnetic radiation on themselves and their young 
family . They attempt to sue a network operator in trespass . The fact scenario is 
essentially that of the Shirley case, except that the issue of private land rights is isolated by 
removing the public school as plaintiff 
1 Intention 
The transmission of this radiation is intentional. Network operators intend that the 
radiation will leave the transmitter and radiate out across the local area. The system could 
7 Davies v Bennison above 11 5, 57. 
8 Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd. [1 978] 1 QB 479 [Bernstein v Skyviews]. 
9 Bernstein v Skyviews above 118, 488 . 
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not work any other way. The intentional transmission of cell phone signals is the only use 
the defendant's land is put to . This is the sole purpose of the transmitters. 
2 Directness 
Some have said that directness lies at the heart of the distinction between trespass 
and private nuisance. 10 But the meaning of directness is somewhat hard to discern. In 
Southport v Esso Petroleum Denning LJ canvassed the old cases that turned on directness 
and noted that directness distinguished whether the damage to the plaintiff's interest was 
the immediate or consequential result of the defendant's actions .
11 
It might be argued that cancer is only the indirect consequence of RF radiation. 
But it is not the cancer which is complained of; rather it is the invasion of plaintiff's 
boundaries which is the ' damage '. That invasion is immediate result of the defendant ' s 
activities. 
Indeed, if ' immediate ' is also to be coloured by the notion of instantaneously, then 
it is quite clear that RF radiation satisfies the directness requirement because cell phone 
conversations occur without delay. 
3 Invasion 
Does this radiation constitute an invasion of airspace? ' Invasion ' denotes some 
undesirable entry. This radiation certainly enters the property. This is easily proven by the 
use of a cell phone; where it is able to receive a signal, the radiation must be present. 
When the tort of trespass was first defined it was almost certainly believed that the 
invasion had to take the form of a group of particles. This was because centuries ago they 
had no concept of energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation. However, the mere 
fact that they did not contemplate such a phenomenon does not render the trespass cause 
10 Stephen Todd (ed) The l aw of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brooker's Wellington, 1997) 473 . 
11 Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ld [1 954) 2 QB 182, 195-196 (CA). 
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of action inapplicable. In fact, it is interesting to note that the action was already defined 
in such a way that it could comfortably encompass electromagnetic radiation. The essence 
of the tort is the interest that it protects, not the substance of the invasion. 
4 Does trespass require proof ~f damage? 
Historically, trespass has been actionable per se, that is, that it is not incumbent 
upon the plaintiff to show that there has been any actual damage to their land. It is 
enough that their exclusive right to possession has been injured. Entick v Carrington is 
the classic authority for this proposition. Chief Justice Lord Camden stated that "every 
invasion of private property . . . is a trespass . . . though the damage be nothing . . . . "
12 
Theoretically, plaintiffs do not need to show that the electromagnetic radiation has actually 
caused any damage to themselves or to their land to establish that an actionable trespass 
has been committed. It remains to be seen, whether in fact they would need to show 
damage to ensure that the Court awards an injunction. 
5 The United States vibration cases 
There has been significantly more litigation about intangible substances 
constituting a trespass in the United States, than there has been in New Zealand, or even in 
England. This is due, in part, to the fact that some States have barred actions in private 
nuisance for vibrations. This has forced plaintiffs to frame their action in trespass . The 
courts have generally been happy to recognise vibrations as a trespass in return for 
imposing the additional requirement of damage. 13 While it is encouraging to read the 
more liberal judgments on what may constitute a trespass, the cases are of little value in 
New Zealand because of their damage requirement. It must also be remembered that the 
12 Entick v Carrington above n 4, 50. 
13 See generally Wilson v Interlake Steel Co (1982) 649 P 2d 922 (Cal S Ct). 
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distinction between trespass and private nuisance in the United States is not drawn by 
directness like it is in the Commonwealth countries. 
Bedell v Coulter was a case where the defendants were engaged in blasting 
operations which caused vibrations to travel onto the plaintiff's land and cause damage to 
the actual land. 14 Justice Lusk noted that the law recognised trespasses where debris had 
been cast onto the plaintiff's land, and he saw no reason why the rule of liability should be 
any different where the same blast had instead caused vibrations.
15 Later in his judgment, 
Lusk J reviewed the rule in Rylands v Fletcher16 and concluded that
17 
It requires very little ex'tension of this doctrine to apply it to the facts of the present 
case. And there is slight difficulty in holding that one who engages in blasting 
operations which set in motion vibrations and concussions of the earth and air which 
reach to another's land - no matter how far distant - and shatter his dwelling, 
commits a trespass no less than one who accomplishes the same result by the 
propulsion of rocks or other material. 
McNeill v Redington concerned a drop forging plant which used industrial 
hammers 24 hours a day; the vibrations caused damage to the plaintiff's houses. 
18 The 
plaintiffs were barred by statute from claiming private nuisance. Instead they tried to 
claim trespass. The court did not evaluate the facts of the case, it simply said that "[t]he 
evidence and findings sustain the allegations [ of trespass]. "
19 
Wilson v Interlake Steel Co was a case of factory working around the clock, 
creating sufficient noise to annoy the neighbours, but with no evidence of damage. 
20 
14 Bedell v Coulter (1953) 261 P 2d 842 (Ore S Ct). 
15 Bedell v Coulter above n 14, 844. 
16 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (I-IL). 
17 Bedell v Coulter above n 14, 850. 
18 lv!cNeill v Redington (1944) 154 P 2d 428 (Cal Dist Ct App) . 
19 McNeil/ v Redington above n 18, 430. 
20 Wilson v Interlake Steel above n 13. 
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Justice Richardson, quoting from Estate of McDil/21 noted that in cases of noise, 
vibrations, or gas emissions, "[trespass has] been predicated upon the deposit of 
particulate matter upon the plaintiff's property or on actual physical damage thereto."22 
6 Can energy constitute a trespass? 
United States case law has also canvassed the possibility of energy alone 
constituting a trespass. However, implicit in the following case is the fact that actual 
damage was done to the plaintiff's interest. 
The plaintiff in Martin v Reynolds Metals Company complained that the nearby 
aluminium manufacturer had caused fluoride compounds to settle on his land, thereby 
poisoning cattle, and damaging vegetation.23 The defendant tried to argue that the Court 
should apply a dimensional test, in essence, that the fluoride compounds were invisible to 
the naked eye, and as such, were too small to constitute a trespass. The Court rejected 
that test, choosing instead to appreciate that energy may constitute a trespass. Justice 
O'Connell noted that McNeil! v Redington was an instance of trespass by the transmission 
of energy, "nothing more than the movement of molecules one against another".24 
The Court recognised that the old cases of trespass only dealt with collections of 
particles of a visible size, not because there was some unwritten rule that only visible 
things could constitute a trespass, but because the courts back then did not know of the 
atomic world. "In fact , the now famous equation E=mc2 has taught us that mass and 
energy are equivalents and that our concept of 'things ' must be reframed". 25 Justice 
O'Connell went on to note that energy is the vital test, not dimension.26 
21 Estate of McDi/1 (1975) 537 P 2d 874 (Cal Dist Ct App). 
22 Wilson v Interlake Steel above n 13, 924. 
23 Martin v Reynolds Metals Company (1959) 342 P 2d 790 (Ore S Ct). 
24 A!artin v Reynolds Metals Company above n 23, 793. 
25 Martin v Reynolds Metals Company above n 23, 793. 
26 Martin v Reynolds Metals Company above n 23, 794. 
If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality which is used in making 
an intrusion upon another's land we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force 
rather than its size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion 
which invades the possessor' s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that 
intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be 
measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist. 
10 
In San Diego Gas & Elec Co the plaintiff alleged trespass by electromagnetic fields 
that surrounded the power lines of the defendant. 27 The Court held that the rule in Wilson 
v Interlake Steel applied. The electromagnetic radiation was classed with "all intangible 
intrusions, such as noise, odor, or light alone, (which] are dealt with as nuisance cases, not 
trespass". 28 To establish a trespass, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the 
electromagnetic radiation had caused some actual damage to their property, not just a risk 
of harm to the property's occupants.29 The plaintiffs tried to argue that the loss in the 
house' s value was sufficient damage, but the Court found that did not satisfy the test of 
physical damage.30 
The United States cases are useful for the responses they give to allegations of 
intangible trespass, but ultimately they are of little assistance because they turn on the 
issue of damage, which in New Zealand is immaterial to establishing liability. 
V THE REMEDY FOR TRESPASS 
Electromagnetic radiation from cellsites can found a claim in trespass. It is an 
intentional, direct, invasion of private property. But what remedy are the plaintiffs entitled 
to? Sheffer v City of London Electric Lighting Co is authority for the rule that, in the 
27 San Diego Gas & Elec Co v Superior Court (1 996) 920 P 2d 669, 695 (Cal) [San Diegoj. 
28 Wilson v Interlake Steel above n 13. 
29 San Diego above n 27, 695. 
30 San Diego above n 27, 695-696. 
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event of an ongoing trespass, there is a presumption that the plaintiffs should be awarded 
· · · 31 an mJunct10n. 
A The Effect of Granting an Injunction 
While the plaintiffs obviously want an injunction; to grant one would be quite 
disruptive to the rest of New Zealand. It would take only one citizen in each major city of 
New Zealand to be awarded an injunction to render the cell phone network unworkable. 
This would be an enormous step backwards for New Zealand business, and for New 
Zealanders themselves. 
More and more people use cell phones every year. All sorts of businesses use cell 
phones to keep in touch with their customers. Financial services, like EFT-POS, can now 
be maintained anywhere in the country by using a cell phone link between the bank and the 
vendor. Access to the internet through a combination of cell phones and laptops is an 
exciting area of development for New Zealand businesses. 
Cell phones are also increasingly being used as a safety backup in the outdoors. 
These days many people carry a cell phone in case their car breaks down. Or they take a 
cell phone when tramping or sailing. 
It seems preposterous that one private property owner could bring a stop to all 
that. And it is not only the cell phone network which could be stopped . Radio and 
television signals work on exactly the same principles, and could equally be a target for an 
action in trespass. Surely the courts would not award such an injunction. But do they 
have any choice? 
B Issues that are Immaterial to the Granting of an Injunction 
The courts are bound only to consider certain issues when they consider granting 
an injunction. First, the public benefit derived from the trespassory action of the defendant 
31 Shelfer vCityofLondon E!ectricLightingCo [1895] 1 Ch287 (CA) [She/fer] . 
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is wholly immaterial to the Court's deliberations. Secondly, the Court is not free to 'sell' 
the plaintiffs rights to the defendant simply because the defendant can afford to pay a 
considerable sum for them. Thirdly, Parliament is the only body that can authorise the 
expropriation of interests in privately held land. 
1 Public benefit is immaterial 
The very reason why an injunction should not be awarded is the very reason that 
the courts can take no cognisance of Private property is considered by the Common Law 
to be so important that its protection will not depend on what is best for the general 
public. William Blackstone wrote in the 18°1 century that
32 
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not 
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole 
community. 
This principle is also reflected in the fact that the tort of private nuisance also does 
not afford the courts the right to refer to public benefit as a reason not to award an 
injunction. There is one notable exception to this rule; the case of Miller v Jackson 
concerned a nuisance created by a local cricket club hitting balls into the neighbour's 
property. 33 Lord Denning found that no injunction should be granted because it would 
harm the cricket club, and therefore, harm society. His reasoning has not been followed in 
New Zealand. In Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, Hardie Boys J recognised "the 
valiant efforts of the cricket-loving members of the Court in Miller v Jackson", but found 
that the authorities (including She/fer) prevented the Court from putting the public interest 
32 William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England Robert Malcolm Kerr (ed) (3 ed, 
John Murray, London, 1862) Book I, 139 (page numbers refer to Blackstone's original work) 
[CommentariesJ. 
33 Miller v Jackson [1977] 3 All ER 338 per Lord Denning MR. 
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before that of the plaintiff's. 34 Private nuisance is less strict than trespass; if that action 
cannot take into account public benefit, then the action of trespass surely cannot, either. 
She/fer makes it clear that the effect of an injunction on the public is not a factor 
that the courts may consider. Lord Justice Lindley said that "[t]his case is accordingly 
authority to shew that an injunction would not be refused on the ground that the public 
might be inconvenienced if an injunction were granted". 35 
2 Rights shall not be sold 
For the Court to award damages instead of granting an injunction, is to allow the 
defendant to buy the plaintiff's rights, and continue trespassing indefinitely. Property 
rights are not for sale except at the direction of the plaintiff. Lord Halsbury recognised 
this principle in Sheljer .36 
[T]he effect of [refusing] an injunction in a case like the present would necessarily 
operate to enable a company who could afford it to drive a neighbouring proprietor to 
sell, whether he would or no, by continuing a nuisance, and simply paying damages 
for its continuance. 
Lord Justice A L Smith recognised the same. 37 
Many judges have stated, and I emphatically agree with them, that a person by 
committing a wrongful act ... is not thereby entitled to ask the Court to sanction his 
doing so by purchasing his neighbour' s rights, by assessing damages in that behalf, 
leaving his neighbour with the nuisance .... 
34 Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525, 535 (HC). 
35 Sheffer above n 31,315. 
36 Shefferaboven31,311. 
37 Sheffer above n 31. 322. 
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3 Only Parliament may expropriate property 
Similar to the idea that Courts do not have the authority to sell the plaintiff's rights 
to the defendant, is the rule that only Parliament may expropriate property. For example, 
where land is required for a motorway the local authorities can only acquire the land 
through the authority conveyed by statute. In Entick v Carrington Camden LJ recognised 
that it was possible to dispossess individual ' s of their land, but only by positive law.38 
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property. That 
right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been 
taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. The cases 
where this right of property is set aside by the positive law, are various. Distresses, 
executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc are all of this description; wherein every man by 
common consent gives up that right, for the sake of justice and the general good. 
An ongoing trespass infringes the plaintiff's interest in their land, in effect it lessens 
their interest in favour of the defendant. The court cannot authorise such an expropriation 
without some positive law provided by Parliament. 
4 Conclusion 
The very reason why it seems obvious that courts should not award an injunction 
in this situation, is the very reason the courts have no authority to consider. The public 
benefit derived from a comprehensive cellular network is immaterial to the Court ' s 
decision whether to grant an injunction or not. 
However, it is still possible to argue within the law that the plaintiffs should not be 
awarded an injunction. While keeping within the strict boundaries of the She/fer test, it 
can be demonstrated that damages are a suitable substitute for an injunction. 
38 Entick v Carrington above n 4, 50 . 
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VI THE SHELFER TEST 
The case of She/fer concerned an ongomg nuisance created by the vibrations 
emanating from the defendant's plant, making the upper level of the plaintiff's house 
uninhabitable. 39 The Court held that the plaintiff was prima facie entitled to an injunction, 
but that this presumption could be rebutted, and damages might be awarded instead.
40 
In my opinion, it may be stated as a good working rule that-
(1.) If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small, 
(2.) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money, 
(3.) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment, 
(4 .) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an 
injunction:-
then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given. 
Before any analysis of these four steps is undertaken, it is important to understand 
where the burden of proof lies, what the standard of proof is, and to which elements of the 
test the burden attaches. 
A The Burden and Standard of Proof 
1 The burden of proof 
Once a plaintiff has made out a case for an actionable trespass, there is a 
presumption that they will be granted an injunction. This presumption can be rebutted by 
satisfying the She/fer test. Clearly, it is the defendants who must rebut the presumption, 
and consequently, the burden of proof lies with them. 
3 9 Sheffer above n 31. 
40 Sheffer above n 31,322. 
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The burden of proof, however, does not attach itself to all the steps in the test. 
Logically, the burden of proof can only apply to questions of fact. In this hypothetical 
scenario the only facts that are relevant to the test are those regarding the probability that 
the defendants caused an adverse consequence, the nature of any adverse consequence, 
the cost of installing the cellsite, and whether or not the defendant had received good 
value for that expenditure. These facts relate only to parts of steps one and four. All the 
other elements of the She/fer test are evaluations which the court must make. "The 
balance of probabilities test applies to (i) the primary facts of a case; (ii) the secondary 
facts - inferences drawn by the Court from the primary facts; but not to (iii) evaluations 
.. . which are not facts at all".
41 
2 The Standard of Proof 
Usually in civil trials the standard of proof is ' on the balance of probabilities '. 
When speculating about events yet to occur Diplock L had this to say about ' the balance 
of probabilities '42 -
[T]he phrase is inappropriate when applied not to ascertaining what has already 
happened but to prophesying what, if it happens at all, can only happen in the future . 
There is no general rule of English law that when a Court is required . . . to take 
account of what may happen in the future . . . it must ignore any possibility of 
something happening merely because the odds on its happening are fractionally less 
than evens. 
President Cooke has also recognised that a balance of probabilities test is 
inapplicable in cases of future risk, and has articulated the idea that ultimately the courts 
must use their judicial discretion as to what constitutes an unreasonable risk. In 
Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman the Police were withholding documents requested 
41 D L Mathieson Cross on Evi de nee ( 5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1996) 15 5 ( emphasis in the 
original) . 
42 Fernanadez v Government of Singapore [I 971] 2 All ER 691 , 696 (HL) (emphasis added). 
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by the Ombudsman under the Official Information Act 1982.
43 The court had to decide 
the meaning of "likely" in the context of section 6, whether the release of the information 
"would be likely ... ( c) to prejudice the maintenance of the law . . . . " 
To require a threat to be established as more likely to eventuate than not would be 
unreal. It must be enough if there is a serious or real and substantial risk to a 
protected interest, a risk that might well eventuate. . . . Whether such a risk exists 
must be largely a matter of judgment. 
Thjs view corresponds with the notion that risk is composed of two variables, the 
probability of an occurrence, and the severity of the occurrence. The first variable can be 
objectively determined by recourse to scientific evidence. The second variable can only be 
judged by intuition, it is a subjective test. The defendants must prove the objective 
element of the risk, but the final evaluation of the reasonableness of the risk rest with the 
court. 
3 A damage requirement by the back door 
When the court assesses the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights, theoretically the 
only evidence they will have before them is that adduced by the defendant. It is possible 
that in the absence of any contradictory evidence, the court might easily find that there had 
been only a small injury to the plaintiff's rights . Perhaps the Sheffer test actually admits a 
damage requirement into trespass by the back door. Ostensibly trespass is actionable 
without proof of damage, but the practical necessity of adducing evidence as to the risk 
created by the defendant ' s activities suggests otherwise. 
43 Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman [1988] 1 NZLR 385, 391 (CA) . 
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B 'Legal Rights' 
The first step of the test is to establish that the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is 
small . What do the words 'legal rights ' mean in this context? One answer could be that 
they mean the right not to have one' s boundaries invaded intentionally. While this might 
be an obvious answer, it is not a helpful one because it reduces the test to a simple inquiry 
into the physical size of the invasion, or alternatively an inquiry into the degree of the 
defendant's intent. In effect, this just repeats the inquiry whether there was an actionable 
trespass in the first place. This answer does not elucidate what rights are protected by the 
trespass cause of action. 'Legal rights' represent much more than just the boundaries of 
the actual property. 
1 The notion of private property 
Private property is an artificial construct. As William Blackstone put it - "there is 
no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should 
convey the dominion of land .... "44 
Blackstone formulated four reasons why private property exists. First, the Bible 
stated that God had given to man ' dominion' over the earth and everything in it.
45 
Secondly, increasingly scarce resources push people to stake a private claim to that which 
has previously been held in common.46 Thirdly, private property rights encourage people 
to invest their labour and resources in their own land, certain in the knowledge that they 
can not be dispossessed.47 Finally, Blackstone drew on the example of well-regarded 
44 Commentaries above n 32, Book II, 2. 
45 Commentaries above n 32, Book II, 2. 
46 Commentaries above n 32, Book IL 6. 
47 Commentaries above n 32, Book II, 4, 7. 
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classical peoples, like the Greeks and the Phoenicians, who had rightly colonised new 
lands for their increasing populations. 48 
Blackstone's second and third points are still valid today. Essentially, private 
property rights are a social construct designed to facilitate peaceful relations between 
citizens. Property rights function not just between the owner and the land itself, but rather 
more importantly between the owner and everyone else in the world; for it is against 
others that rights are enforced. 
'Property' is not technically the thing itself which is owned but the condition of being 
owned. A complex view of property shows it to be a set or bundle of relationships 
constituted by notions like rights, powers and duties. The relationships are obviously 
not solely between the owner and the 'thing' in question but include also other 
persons. 49 
2 Rights are not absolute 
Before the content of private property rights is analysed, we must examine the 
extent to which any of the traditionally accepted rights can be enforced against another. 
Blackstone wrote that-50 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the ex1ernal things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe . 
Blackstone used that statement to illustrate the underlying philosophy of private property 
rights, but even he admitted that rights are relative. 51 It is obvious that not everyone can 
maintain absolute rights all the time. Landowner A cannot maintain a right to play the 
48 Commentaries above n 32, Book II, 7. 
49 William N R Lucy and Catherine Mitchell "Replacing Private Property: the Case for Stewardship" 
(1996) 55 CLJ 566, 567. 
50 Commentaries above n 32, Book II, 2 (emphasis added). 
51 Commentaries above n 32, Book III, 212-213 . 
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bagpipes all night, while Landowner B insists on perfect silence day after day. One's 
rights only extend to that point where they meet one ' s neighbour ' s rights corning the other 
way. This is a reasonable proposition, it allows people to live amicably side-by-side. It 
recognises that individuals are actually just part of a larger group. As John Donne put it 
"No man is an Island, entire of itself ... "52 
3 The content of private property rights 
What then, is the content of these rights? It is very difficult to give a 
comprehensive definition of property rights, they are perhaps best illustrated by examples. 
They include both positive rights and freedoms. Positive rights include the right to build 
structures on your land, the right to grow crops and harvest them, the right to make a 
noise on your own land. Negative rights include the right to be free from people walking 
on your lawn, and the right to be free from loud noises created by your neighbour. 
Having established that rights are relative, we can now analyse whether there exists 
a right to be free from the increased risk of adverse health effects. The tort of private 
nuisance provides the answer. Private nuisance protects a person' s use and enjoyment of 
land. Land can only be enjoyed if there are no adverse health effects suffered while one 
lives on the land or uses the land. For example, imagine if your neighbour had been 
removing asbestos insulation from her building and had left it out in the open where the 
wind then carried asbestos particles over your boundary. That is clearly a nuisance, it 
disturbs your enjoyment of land. It might be argued that the actions of trespass and 
private nuisance protect different interests in land; trespass protects one's right to 
exclusive possession, and nuisance protects one's use and enjoyment of land. But these 
are just two sides of the same coin. The distinction between nuisance and trespass is 
delineated by directness and intention, not by the interest involved. Title to land confers 
both the right to exclusive possession, and the right to undisturbed use and enjoyment. 
52 John Donne "Meditation XVII" Devotions upon Emergent Occassions (1624) in Angela Partington 
(ed) The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) 253. 
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To recap in light of the She/fer test, this means that plaintiff's legal rights include 
the right to be free from risk that is increased because of the defendant ' s activities . But, 
because rights are relative, this is only the right to be free from unreasonable risk. 
4 What constitutes an unreasonable risk? 
All human activity involves some element of risk. It is impossible to say with 
absolute certainty that some adverse consequence will never occur in the future as a result 
of the defendant ' s activities. So, if all activities necessarily involve some risk, then all 
landowners have the right to cause their neighbours some degree of increased risk. At 
what point, though, does the risk become unreasonable? To answer this question, one 
must have an appreciation of the two variables denoted by ' risk ' . 
(a) The probability of the risk 
This is an objective inquiry into the likelihood that an event will occur; one in ten, 
or one in ten thousand? It is not sufficient to simply state an acceptable probability factor 
for risk. Probability is only meaningful in the context of the nature of the consequence. 
(b) The nature of the risk 
This is a subjective inquiry. It relies on one' s perception of the severity of the 
consequence of the risk. For example, the consequence might be a stubbed toe, or it 
might be an amputated foot. Both risks could be equally likely, but both will not be 
equally acceptable. When the severity of the risk is perceived to be less, the risk becomes 
more reasonable . 
In this hypothetical, the risk of developing cancer from ' 'RF radiation emitted by 
the cellsite is extremely low" .53 So, the probability is very low, but the nature of cancer 
makes one think that it is a risk best avoided. The Environment Court in Shirley evaluated 
53 Shirley above n 1, 89 . 
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many recent scientific studies adduced by both the primary school and Telecom, before 
ruling that the increased risk of cancer was so small that it was acceptable. 
5 The difficulties involved in assessing risk 
The probability of risk is not always easily determined. This is due to a number of 
reasons. The first is that often the scientific studies are not exactly on point. They might 
have been conducted in another country, or under conditions that vary from those 
experienced by the plaintiff 
An assessment of the increased risk necessarily requires some statistics of the 
situation before the defendant began their activities. These may not be available, or they 
may be out of date. It would certainly be difficult nowadays to find a control group that is 
not currently subject to any RF radiation, and has never been subject to RF radiation. 
The studies that were presented in the Shirley case do not prove or disprove that 
RF radiation causes cancer. At most, the studies demonstrate that there might be an 
association between the two phenomena. This is to say, where an increased rate of cancer 
was discovered, it was also noted that the community was subject to RF radiation. Most 
of the studies agreed that it was not possible draw any conclusions beyond an association 
between cancer and RF radiation. 
Because the human body is so complex, it is very difficult to establish exactly 
what causes cancer. There are three different possible causal relationships. Mutual 
exclusion: the cancer is wholly the result of only one factor; either the RF radiation, or 
another factor like genetics, but not both. Independent sufficiency: both genetic and RF 
radiation are present in the community, either factor would be enough to produce the 
cancer on its own. Necessary contribution: neither factor is enough on its own to cause 
cancer, but together they produce the cancer. 
54 It will take some considerable time before 
we understand which relationship is at work with RF radiation. The defendant ought only 
to be found responsible for the extra cases of cancer that its activities generate. 
54 Bruce Pardy "Risk, Cause and Toxic Torts: a Theory for a Standard of Proof' ( I 989) 10 Advocates ' 
Quarterly 277, 280 . 
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Regardless of the actual causal relationship, a crude assessment of the number of extra 
cases can be calculated by looking at cancer rates before and after RF radiation was 
intoduced into the plaintiff's community. 
There is also the complicating factor of which types of cancer the RF radiation 
might trigger in humans. Also rates of incidence in the community will change over the 
years . Breast cancer rates might decline, while lung cancer cases increase. 
The difficulties in assessing risk will vary from case to case. These points simply 
illustrate the fact that the courts face considerable difficulties in assessing the actual risk 
that the defendant's activities pose. 
6 Conclusion 
The first step of the Sheffer test can be satisfied . The injury to the plaintiff's legal 
rights is small because the defendant does have the right to inflict a small degree of 
increased risk on his or her neighbours, and the Environment Court in Shirley found that 
the increased risk of cancer was "extremely low". 55 
C ls the Injury Capable of Being Estimated in Money? 
The second step of the Sheffer test assesses whether the injury to the plaintiff's 
legal rights is capable of being estimated in money. Many ongoing trespasses might be 
very easily estimated in money. For example, if the paintwork on a house has been 
damaged, a quote for its repair is easily obtainable. The same can not be said of damage 
to the human body. Usually, no amount of money can repair the damage that is done. 
It is faintly obscene to suggest that if someone was guaranteed to develop cancer, 
then this injury could be estimated in money. Therein lies the problem for the plaintiff. 
They cannot prove that their cancer is caused by the RF radiation produced by the 
defendants. It may be that they do not even have cancer yet, but have simply brought an 
55 Shirley above n 1, 89. 
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action in trespass as a preventative measure . Really the plaintiff is concerned about the 
increased risk of developing cancer. It is this extra risk which is the injury to the plaintiff's 
legal rights, and it is this extra risk which can be estimated in money. 
If there is already a 2 per cent risk of developing cancer, and then this risk grows 
to 7 per cent after the introduction of RF radiation in the community, the defendants are 
responsible for an extra 5 per cent risk. Damages could be estimated at 5 per cent of the 
total compensation that would be paid out to someone who had actually developed cancer. 
In this case, if the usual compensation were $100,000 then 5 per cent of this would be 
$5,000. 56 
Courts themselves are also capable of estimating the injury to the plaintiff's right. 
Damage to human health that has already occurred is often compensated by a monetary 
payment. Courts have ample experience in estimating the value of good health to humans. 
It may be unpleasant to put a monetary value on disease, but it is certainly possible to do . 
Step two of the She/fer test is thus satisfied. In situations of increased risk 
damages reflect the extent to which the defendant is responsible for the risk present in the 
community. Increased risk lends itself to a monetary payment because it is easier for the 
court to express a proportional response in money than it is in an injunction. Finally, the 
court is experienced in putting a value on harm to human health . 
D Adequate Compensation by a Small Money Payment 
The third step of the She/fer test requires that the injury to the plaintiff's legal 
rights can be adequately compensated by a small money payment. We have already seen 
that it is right that the defendant should only be liable for the extra cases of cancer that its 
activities cause. The actual number of extra cases will necessarily be very small or else the 
risk would have been classed as unreasonable, and the defendant would never have passed 
the first step of the test. Paying out a proportion of the total cost of compensating a case 
of cancer which relates to the proportion of extra cases caused by the defendant will result 
56 See generally Pardy, above n 5-l . 
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in a small monetary figure . For example, if the compensation for cancer is $100,000 and 
the extra risk of developing cancer was one in ten thousand, the defendant would be liable 
for only $10. 
Because a reasonable risk in situations of cancer will necessarily involve very sma11 
probabilities, the quantum of damages will always be very small. Therefore, step three of 
the Sheffer test is satisfied. 
E Oppressive to the Defendant to Grant an Injunction? 
In this fact scenario, this is the most easily satisfied element of the test. It would 
be enormously oppressive to the network operator to award an injunction. They cannot 
operate their business in any other way; it is not just a matter of finding quieter machines. 
The case of Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co concerned a sign which had been 
attached to the wall defendant's building, but that overhung only a matter of inches into 
the plaintiff's airspace.57 Justice McNair, in considering whether it was oppressive to the 
defendant to award an injunction, implied that if the defendant had received good value 
from the trespassing sign, then it was immaterial that considerable expenditure had been 
incurred in erecting the sign initially. 58 
It was true that considerable expense ... was incurred some seven years ago in erecting 
this sign, but I have no evidence at all as to whether the defendant company have not 
had good value for that ex_,,enditure. 
Turning to cellphone networks in New Zealand, the network operators (like 
Telecom) have presumably made a very large investment in the hope that over the next 
few decades the investment would pay itself off It began its cell phone network a little 
over ten years ago. The cost of developing a comprehensive network throughout the 
57 Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co [1957] 2 QB 334 [Kelsen] . 
58 Kelsen above n 57, 346-347. 
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country that can handle the increasing number of calls must be enormous. It is doubtful 
that Telecom has received good value for its expenditure yet. 
The last step of the She/fer test is easily satisfied. It would be very oppressive to a 
defendant in this type of case to grant an injunction to the plaintiff. 
AJI four steps of the She/fer test can be satisfied, the defendants have rebutted the 
presumption for an injunction. Court is now free to award damages in substitution for an 
injunction. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Electromagnetic radiation emitted from cellsites can constitute an actionable 
trespass. The plaintiff is prima facie entitled to an injunction. But, it would be intolerable 
to the public of New Zealand if the courts granted one. Television and radio services 
could also be threatened by actions in trespass. This puts the courts in a difficult position. 
While they might appreciate the disruption that would be caused to the public; it has long 
been held that public benefit is immaterial to the granting of an injunction. As Sophocles, 
the 5th century BC Greek dramatist, wrote "[n]obody has a more sacred obligation to obey 
the law than those who make the law". 59 The courts may only refuse to grant an 
injunction if they can base their reasoning on precedent and principle. 
The Sheffer test sets out a four step process to determine those cases in which it 
would be appropriate to award damages in substitution for an injunction. This test can be 
satisfied in the scenario of RF radiation from cellsites. It is both possible for the courts 
recognise that the radiation does constitute an actionable trespass, while still finding that 
an award of nominal damages is justified by law. This test allows the integrity of the 
trespass cause of action to be maintained. The court need not twist the test to ensure that 
an injunction is not granted. 
59 Bruce Nash and Allan Zullo (eds) Lawyers · Wit and Wisdom (Running Press, Philadelphia, 1995) 
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